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STUDENT ARTICLES
Will Credit Cardholders Default over
Minimum Payment Hikes?
By Julia Lane*
I. Introduction
Early in his career, the former CEO of Citibank, Walter
Wriston was asked by his boss, "'What is this with people wanting
credit?"' He replied curtly, "'Look, we just put five years of our life
in a brown suit carrying an Ml rifle, and we want the refrigerator
now."' 1 It is this type of mentality that has allowed the credit card
industry to flourish in the United States, becoming one of the largest
and most lucrative industries in our economy. 2 Credit card issuers
have tapped into the pent-up demand for consumer goods that
commenced with the baby boomer generation and has been embraced
by Americans ever since. 3 The American attitude of "buy now, pay
later" fuels an industry that boasted profits of $30 billion in 2004. 4
Over the past twenty-five years, the credit card industry has soared in
popularity and the American people have become increasingly
dependent upon it to finance even some of their most basic needs
* Julia Lane, J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law; Bachelor of Arts in History, 2003, Boston College.
Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry, PUB. BROADCAST
SERVICE, FRONTLINE, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/credit/more/rise.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Melody Hobson, New Rules Will Double Typical Monthly Minimums - Is it
Good News for Consumers?, ABC NEWS, Jul. 20, 2005, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/print?id=954593.
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such as food and other necessities. 5 Today, 76% of American
households own at least one credit card,6 and the total consumer debt
carried by Americans in 2005 was $800.1 billion.7
The desire for instant satisfaction has caused Americans to
pay billions in interest and financing fees, which can double the total
cost of their purchases. 8 But are consumers aware of the terms of
their cards, and, if so, why have they allowed their balances to get so
high? Further, at the high annual percentage interest rates offered,
will Americans be able to pay back their debt in their lifetimes?
Between 2004 and early 2006, almost all credit card
companies have increased, or even doubled, the monthly minimum
payment a cardholder must make to avoid defaulting on his credit
card loan.9 For the 40% of Americans who pay their balances in full,
this change will have no effect on their personal finances. l
Moreover, it would probably surprise those cardholders who pay in
full that the credit card industry terms them "deadbeats."" Credit
card companies do not make a dollar off consumers who pay their
balances in full, and essentially give those consumers a short-term,
5 Karen Krebsbach, Consumers are Overspending. That's Work for Credit
Counselors, US BANKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 41.
6 Emily Heffter, Credit-Card Rule may Break your Back, The Seattle Times,
Jan. 1, 2006, at L6.
7 Demos: A Network for Ideas and Action, Comments Regarding Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Review of the Open-End (Revolving) Credit Rules
of Regulation Z, Fed. Reserve System Docket No. R-1217 (2005) [hereinafter
Demos], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2005/March/
20050329/R-1217/R-1217_1 10_l.pdf Also quoted as $802.1 billion in revolving
debt as of November, 2005. Fed. Reserve, November 2005 Consumer Credit
Statistical Release, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
g 19/current/g 19.pdf
8 Demos, supra note 7, at 2. At an industry average rate of 2% of a
cardholder's total balance (including all fees, interest and finance charges) or $10,
whichever is greater, a cardholder with an outstanding balance of $10,000 and an
annual percentage rate (APR) of 18% will take 50 years to pay off his debt and may
incur $28,524 in additional interest cost. Id. This assumes he makes no new
purchases over the 50 years. Id.
9 Mara Der Hovanesian, Tough Love for Debtors, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 25,
2005, at 98.
10 Patrick McGeehan et al., Soaring Interest Is Compounding Credit Card
Woesfor Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at A11.
" Pub. Broadcast Service ("PBS"), Secret History of the Credit Card:
Introduction, Frontline, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/credit/etc/synopsis.html.
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interest free loan.' 2
In order to compensate for "deadbeat" customers, over the
past two decades, credit card companies have developed creative
marketing tactics, with intentionally ambiguous terms and
complicated surcharges and fee systems, to trap the borrower who
cannot pay in full. 13 The 115 million Americans who carry at least
some debt over to the next month, nicknamed "revolvers" for their
use of "revolving" credit, more than make up for "deadbeats" by
paying usurious interest rates (typically, more than 18% annually) on
their purchases. 14 "Revolvers" fall into traps set by the credit card
companies that keep their minimum payments low, spreading their
principal payments over time and allow the credit card company to
reap a greater amount of interest.
15
Recently, federal regulations and mandates have required
credit card companies to adhere to federal regulations 16 that require
them to increase their minimum payments from 2% of the
cardholder's total credit card balance (including fees and interest) to
at least 1% of the principal owed on the card. 17 This new rule insures
12 Stein, supra note 1. The credit card company does make a small amount of
money from customers who pay in full. Merchants who accept credit cards must
pay a fee to the credit card company for every purchase made with a card.
Therefore, the credit card company makes money indirectly from customers who
pay in full. Id.
13 PBS, supra note 11, at 2.
14 Id.
15 Demos, supra note 7, at 2. By requiring minimum payments that are less
than the amount of interest accrued per month, the credit card company can extract
greater interest from the cardholder than if he paid a greater percentage of the
principal owed on the loan per month. Id.
16 See discussion infra Part III.A. A joint effort by the FDIC, Federal Reserve
Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have issued an
advisory letter to nationally chartered banks warning them of potential violations of
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) if they do not increase disclosures and require
higher monthly minimum payments for cardholders, who may be unaware of the
extent of the cost of their credit cards. Joint Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
NR 2003-01, FFIEC Agencies Issue Guidance on Credit Card Account
Management and Loss Allowance Practices (Jan. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-01 .htm.
17 Kristin Arnold, Higher Credit Card Minimum Payments in 2006,
BANKRATE.COM, Jan. 2, 2006, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/
20060102al.asp. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency initially only
advised credit card companies to ensure that the rates they offered allowed debtors
to pay back debt "within a reasonable time." The OCC later clarified this to mean
2006]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
that the cardholder's monthly payment covers more than the amount
of interest assessed for that period and has some impact on reducing
the existing balance.' 8 It is estimated that 7% of Americans make
only the minimum payments on their credit cards each month. 19 For
these Americans, this seemingly small increase could be the
difference between filing for bankruptcy and staying financially
afloat; 20 especially given the fact that a recent bankruptcy law passed
by Congress makes filing for bankruptcy more difficult and
21
expensive for consumers.
This article will trace the legal history of the credit card
industry and its rise to power in achieving deregulation. Part II will
address how the Office of the Comptroller ("OCC"), through a series
of Supreme Court decisions, came to regulate the credit card industry.
Part III of the article will discuss new legislative attempts by
Congress and the OCC to better educate consumers and correct some
of the abuses that credit card companies have utilized in achieving
huge profits. Part III will also examine the effect of the new
bankruptcy law, focusing on Title XIII, Consumer Credit
Disclosures, and its effect on those consumers who make only their
minimum payments each month. Part IV will discuss how the
legislation discussed in Part III will affect consumers who carry
extensive credit card debt to manage their finances. Finally, Part IV
will discuss some short-comings of the new law in using disclosure
as a primary method of remedying the problem.
II. Background
Credit cards emerged shortly after World War 11.22 They were
initially unprofitable but have soared in popularity since the 1970s to
at least 1% of the principal payment. Id.; See also Michelle Singletary, We'll Have
to Pay More. Good!, The Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 2005, at FOl. Dean DeBuck, a
spokesman for the Office of the Comptroller was quoted by the Washington Post
saying, "'Because banks were having trouble deciding what was reasonable, we
have gravitated toward 1 percent of the principal,' DeBuck said. 'This is not a hard
and fast rule, and banks may establish other payment amounts."' Id.
18 See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
19 Arnold, supra note 17, at 3.
20 Stein, supra note 1.
21 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
22 Stein, supra note 1.
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become one of the most lucrative industries in the United States.23
Part of the success of the credit card industry can be attributed to the
fact that states are virtually powerless to regulate it and, until
recently, the OCC never restricted the industry's credit terms.
24
Without regulation or competition from other types of credit, the
industry has lent credit at high rates for more than twenty-five years,
while simultaneously expanding the number of merchants and stores
that accept credit cards.
2P
A. Legal History of the Credit Card Industry
The first general purpose credit card was released by Bank of
America in 1958.26 The bank sent a mass mailing of 60,000 cards
("card drop") to residents in Fresno, California, hoping to attract
customers with a new type of "revolving" credit, which could be used
for purchases everywhere and paid off over time. Other banks
quickly followed with their own "card drops," and merchants reacted
to provide their customers with the option of using their cards instead
of cash.28 In the first decade of use, "card drops" caused much
commotion and fraud with few profits. 29 However, by the 1970s,
banks that survived the initial start up issues began to produce profits,
and the "revolving credit" revolution had proved that it was here to
stay.3 °
23 id.
24 See generally Mark Furletti, The Debate Over the National Bank Act and
the Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 425
(2004).
25 Stein, supra note 1.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. Advances in technology allowed merchants to use automated systems
improving efficiency. Id. Also, the two companies that would become Visa and
MasterCard worked together to link a nationwide network of merchants who would
accept their cards. Id.
29 Id.
30 Stein, supra note 1. An incident dubbed "The Chicago Debacle" that
occurred during the holiday season in 1966, shocked Americans. A group of
Midwestern banks "dropped" five million cards into the mail addressed to anyone
from toddlers, to convicted felons and even dogs. Id. Corrupt postal workers sold
the cards to organized crime rings and suburban housewives were billed for charges
they never made. Id. The incident caused such a disruption that there was even a
2006] 335
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1. State Laws
Early credit cards were issued by local, state-chartered
banks 31 and were regulated by state usury laws.32 States had statutes
that set maximum rates of interest that a credit card company or bank
could charge a debtor.33 Typically, state usury laws created ceilings
for interest rates that were comparatively lower than the rates charged
by credit card companies today.
34
As credit cards gained popularity, banks specializing in credit
cards emerged.35 These banks had national charters and solicited
customers across state lines to offer their services to customers in
other states.36 As a result of a series of Supreme Court decisions and
a favorable economic climate, credit card companies discovered they
could circumvent the more restrictive state laws by moving to states
with higher or no ceilings for interest rates 37 and take advantage of
the less stringent regulations enjoyed by nationally chartered banks. 38
movement toward outlawing credit cards. Id.
31 Furletti, supra note 24, at 427-32. State banks are chartered in the state they
are located and regulated by state law as well as the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").
32 Id. Usury is simply understood as the taking of interest. Usury laws have
their origins in antiquity, and the idea that it is improper for creditors to charge
debtors interest on loans has been prevalent in Western society since. Modem
usury statutes have relaxed the prohibition on interest to foster the modem banking
industry. However, states are hesitant to remove the limits altogether and leave
interest rates to market forces. Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Richard
Scott Camell, Banking Law and Regulation, 156-57 (Aspen Law & Business 3d ed.
2001).
33 Id.
34 Furletti, supra note 24, at 427-32.
35 Id.
36 id.
37 Stein, supra note 1. See Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 413
(1873) (discussing that the "national banks have been National favorites" and were
established to for the purpose of providing a currency for the whole country, so
should they not be subject to unfriendly legislation by the States); Marquette Nat'l
Bank of Minn. v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 302 (1978) (holding
that the NBA preempted Minnesota state usury laws that restricted rates offered to
Minnesota customers); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
38 Furletti, supra note 24, at 443.
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2. Inflation and Voluntary Elimination of State Usury Laws
as Barriers
In the late 1970s, credit card companies were squeezed by
double-digit inflation rates and the low interest ceilings of state usury
laws.39 For example, Citibank, located in New York, was subject to a
12% usury ceiling and a 20% inflation rate.40 Lending at 12% would
have been suicide for Citibank, because it would have lost 8% on
each loan.4' Inflation had other negative effects on the national
economy and states such as South Dakota and Delaware took their
usury laws off the books in attempts to encourage lending that would
stimulate the economy.42 These states attracted credit card issuers
which further served to provide their citizens with jobs and stimulate
their local economies.43 Within a short time, the credit card industry
came to be located in only a few states which solicited cardholders
across the country.44 With this adjustment came a change in the
regulation of the credit card industry from state to federal law.45
Today, nationally chartered banks underwrite almost three
quarters of credit card loans made in the United States, all of which
are located in only six states that comprise 4% of the total
population.46 These banks are nationally chartered by a division of
the Treasury called the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"). 47 The OCC was created by the National Bank Act ("NBA")
39 Stein, supra note 1.
40 Id. When New York legislators refused to change the usury laws, Citibank
moved to South Dakota where state usury laws were being eliminated to stimulate
the economy. Citibank promised former Governor, Bill Janklow that if he passed a
law to eliminate usury laws, Citibank would provide at least 400 new jobs to South
Dakota residents in its bank that would not function as a normal bank, but would
only issue cards. The governor, faced with a dire economic situation, complied
with Citibank's request, allowing Citibank to even draft the emergency bill. Within
a year 3,000 new jobs were created for South Dakotans. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Stein, supra note 1.
45 Id.
46 Furletti, supra note 24. As of December 31, 2002, nationally chartered
banks held almost $400 billion of the $550 billion debt in U.S. managed bank card
loans. Id. at 456.
41 Id. at 427.
2006]
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of 1864.48 The agency is granted broad authority by the NBA and via
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,49 has the
ability to preempt state banking laws. ° Through a series of Supreme
Court decisions, the OCC's power to preempt state laws was
repeatedly affirmed.5' This greatly restricted the states' ability to
protect their consumers from both high interest rates and other fees
imposed by credit card issuers.52
3. Marquette v. First Omaha and the Imposition of "Home-
State" Law
Before 1978, credit card banks that solicited cardholders
residing in another state were subject to the state usury laws enacted
by the foreign state.53 For example, when a nationally chartered credit
card issuer based in Delaware solicited an Ohio resident, the rate the
issuer could offer to the Ohio resident was constrained by Ohio state
usury laws.54 However, in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis
v. First of Omaha Service Corp., the Supreme Court interpreted a
provision of the NBA to allow nationally chartered banks to export
the rates permitted in the "home-state" of the credit card issuer to
customers out of state, thereby overriding any existing state laws.
55
In Marquette, a Minnesota credit card issuer ("Marquette"),
48 Id. at 425-26.
49 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The clause reads as follows:
This, Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
50 Furletti, supra note 24, at 428.
51 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 744 (1996) ("there is no
doubt that § 85 pre-empts state law."); Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn. v. First of
Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 302 (1978) (holding that the NBA preempted
Minnesota state usury laws that restricted rates offered to Minnesota customers).
52 Furletti, supra note 24, at 428-30.
53 Id. at 430.
54 Id.
55 Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn., 439 U.S. at 302 (holding that the NBA
preempted Minnesota state usury laws that restricted rates offered to Minnesota
customers).
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sought to enjoin a competing, nationally-chartered credit card issuer
based in Nebraska ("First of Omaha"), from soliciting Minnesota
residents for its BankAmericard program. 6 BankAmericard offered
interest rates of 18% per year for the first $999.99 and 12% per year
on amounts over $1,000 with no annual fee. 57 At the time, Minnesota
usury laws only permitted an interest rate of 12% on all debt, so
Minnesota banks imposed a $15 annual fee to compensate for the
reduced interest.5 First of Omaha was able to seduce Minnesota
customers with cards that charged no annual fee by importing the
higher, "home-state" interest rates.
5 9
Marquette hinged upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Section 85 of the NBA that uses the phrase "where the bank is
located" to determine which state law would apply to a customer
solicited by a foreign state card issuer.60 In rendering its holding, the
Supreme Court looked to the legislative history of the NBA and
concluded that the word "located" was intended to designate the state
where the national bank was organized. 61 Therefore, the Court
determined that, First of Omaha and its BankAmericard program
were "located" in Nebraska, and a plain language reading of Section
85 meant that the bank may charge the rate allowed by the laws of
Nebraska for any loan.62 Further, because there was no law barring
Minnesota residents from physically crossing state lines to obtain a
loan from a Nebraska bank with terms under Nebraska law, it was
inconsequential that Minnesota residents had been solicited by mail.63
The Marquette decision, coupled with the spiraling inflation
rate that encouraged states to abandon their usury laws, caused the
credit card industry to consolidate in states like South Dakota and
Delaware.64 These states permitted credit card issuers to charge
higher interest rates, allowing them to remain solvent without
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 303.
59 Id.
60 Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn., 439 U.S. at 303.
61 Id. at 310.
62 Id. at 313.
63 Id. at 310.
64 Furletti, supra note 24, at 432.
2006]
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imposing annual fees.65 Credit card companies in states that
maintained their usury laws could not compete and consequentially,
were eliminated or forced to relocate.
66
After Marquette, the industry saw huge gains in profits as
inflation rates fell throughout the 1980s. 67 Consumers were willing to
pay 18% interest rates long after the Federal Reserve Board lowered
the interest rates it charged banks.68 Because interest rates remained
high, credit card companies secured a 10% point margin over the
prime rate.69 Between 1980 and 1990, the number of credit cards
doubled and the average balance per American household increased
five-fold from $518 to almost $2,700.70 Credit cards became
increasingly popular and Americans were willing to pay for them at
higher interest rates.
4. The Expanded Meaning of "Interest" and Increasing
Anti-Consumer Practices of Credit Card Issuers
As the credit card industry matured, issuers thought of new
ways to extract more profits from customers. Throughout the 1980s,
credit card companies invented surcharges for past due payments,
fees for spending over the credit limit and returned check fees.
71
Although Marquette paved the way for exported periodic interest
rates, it did not reach the question of whether fees permitted by the
72
"home-state" could be exported as well. Consumers brought suits
against credit card companies in the Third Circuit, 73 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota, 74 and the Supreme Courts of
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Stein, supra note 1.
70 id.
71 Furletti, supra note 24, at 433.
72 Id. at 432.
73 See Spellman v. Meridian Bank (Del.), No. 92-CV-03860, 1995 WL 764548
(3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the Pennsylvania state law that limited late and over
limit fees charged by an out-of-state nationally chartered bank was preempted by
the NBA).
74 See Tikkanen v. Citibank (S.D.), 801 F. Supp. 270, (D. Minn. 1992)
(holding that a Minnesota state statute that limited late and over limit fees charged
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Colorado,75 Pennsylvania,76 and New Jersey. 7 These suits charged
that imposing additional fees were violations of state usury laws.
78
The plaintiffs in these cases argued that although federal law may
preempt the periodic interest rates charged by states, state law could
still regulate the types of surcharges and fees imposed on
cardholders. 79 Despite these efforts, however, most of the resulting
holdings strengthened the credit card companies' ability to levee
additional costs to cardholders.
80
The Supreme Court of New Jersey was the only court to rule
that late fees and penalties were separate and distinct from interest
which it defined as periodic finance charges. 8 1 In its examination of
the legislative history of the NBA, the court found that the
Congressional concern was primarily focused on numerical or
percentage interest rates and not fees. 82 The court further held that
New Jersey state usury laws regarding non-percentage rates as
applied to credit cardholders were not preempted by the NBA.83
It was a Third Circuit decision, however, that would
eventually be utilized by most other jurisdictions. In Spellman v.
Meridian Bank (Delaware), the court affirmed the power of the OCC
by an out-of-state nationally chartered bank was preempted by the NBA).
75 See Copeland v. MBNA Am. Bank, 907 P.2d 87 (Co. 1995) (holding that a
Colorado state statute limiting late and over limit fees charged by out-of-state
federally chartered bank was preempted by NBA); see also Richardson v. Citibank
(S.D.) N.A., 908 P.2d 532 (Co. 1995).
76 See Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Mazaika, 680 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1996)
(citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996)) (holding that flat fees
were included in the term "interest" under Section 85 of the NBA and the flat fees
therefore could be exported along with the interest rates of the home-state to out-
of- state cardholders).
77 Sherman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 668 A.2d 1036, 1040 (N.J. 1995). The
New Jersey's Supreme Court was the only court to hold that, "the understanding of
the word 'interest' as expressed and authorized in the NBA does not include
distinctive and contingent loan terms or charges such as late fees, that are unrelated
to interest rates." Id.
78 Id.
79 Furletti, supra note 24, at 433.
80 Id.
81 Sherman, 668 A.2d at 1043.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1053.
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to preempt any state usury law that outlawed levying fees.8 4 The
Third Circuit held that the word "interest" in Section 85 of the NBA
included fees as well as periodic finance charges. 85 The court relied
heavily on an 1873 case called Tiffany v. National Bank of
Missouri.86 In Tiffany, the Supreme Court interpreted the NBA to
mean that national banks were to be "national favorites," or the "most
favored lender" and free from banking regulations that could hinder
their banking efforts. 87 The Third Circuit interpreted Tiffany to mean
that Congress intended to protect national bank lending activities
from state intervention, to ensure that they would eventually replace
state banks. 88 Moreover, the Third Circuit concluded that restricting
the meaning of interest to only periodic finance charges would lead to
"an undesirable hodgepodge of fee limits and periodic rate
provisions" under the laws of both the bank's home state and the
borrower's state. 89
In 1996, the Supreme Court resolved to settle the divide in the
law when it reviewed a California court's decision in Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A. 90 However, just two months before the Supreme
Court's decision, the OCC issued an official regulation declaring its
power to regulate nationally chartered;banks' fees and interest rates.91
The OCC regulation defined the meaning of interest under Section 85
of the NBA to include: numeric periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient
funds fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and
membership fees. 92 In its ruling, the Supreme Court adopted the
OCC's interpretation 93 and in a unanimous decision written by
84 Spellman, 1995 WL 764548 at *15.
85 id.
86 Furletti, supra note 24, at 434. See also Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Missouri,
85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873) (discussing that the "national banks have been National
favorites" and were established to for the purpose of providing a currency for the
whole country, so should they not be subject to unfriendly legislation by the states).
87 Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 413.
88 Spellman, 1995 WL 764548 at *16.
89 Id.
90 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
9' Furletti, supra note 24, at 435.
92 Id.
13 Id. at 436. The OCC issued its official regulation on February 9, 1996. 61
Fed. Reg. 4849-03, 4869 (Feb. 9, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)). The
Supreme Court heard arguments for Smiley on April 24, 1996. The OCC
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Justice Scalia, the Court reasoned that Congress granted the OCC the
power to interpret any ambiguities found in the NBA.94 Further, the
Court held that it would grant deference to the OCC's interpretations,
requiring only that the regulation be reasonable to be upheld.95 The
Court concluded, without much deliberation, that the OCC regulation
was reasonable. 96 The ruling ended any debate on the matter thereby
encouraging credit card companies to impose additional fees
unhindered by state law.
97
5. California's Failed Attempt to Require Minimum
Warning Payments
In the past decade, consumers have become increasingly
dependent, yet dissatisfied with their credit card lenders. In 2003, the
OCC received 80,000 complaints from consumers. 98 Credit card
companies accounted for the largest source of complaints.99 New
York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, reported that his office gets
thousands of complaints every year about credit card issues, but more
often than not, the banks' responses have been dismissive. 00 Banks
have repeatedly told Spitzer that, "we don't need to deal with you
because the OCC has told us-indeed directed us-not to deal with
interpretation is as follows:
The term "interest" as used in 12 U.S.C. § 85 includes any payment
compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of
credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a
borrower of a condition upon which credit was extended. It includes,
among other things, the following fees connected with credit extension
or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds
(NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and
membership fees. It does not ordinarily include appraisal fees,
premiums and commissions attributable to insurance guaranteeing
repayment of any extension of credit, finders' fees, fees for document
preparation or notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.
61 Fed. Reg. at 4869.
94 Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744-45.
9' Furletti, supra note 24, at 436.
96 Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744-45.
97 Furletti, supra note 24, at 436.
98 McGeehan supra note 10, at 9.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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state enforcement entities."'
0 1
In 2002, the California legislature took matters into its own
hands and enacted California Civil Code Section 1748.13.102 The bill
sought to reduce its citizens' unprecedented levels of insolvency
arising from credit card debt.' The law required credit card
companies to provide a warning to customers about the dangers of
paying only the minimum payment on their monthly statements.' 0 4 In
addition to the general warning about minimum payments, the bill
required that credit card companies either: 0 5 (1) provide a statement
describing the amount of time and total cost it would take to pay off
three hypothetical balances if a cardholder only paid the minimum, or
(2) make a customized statement for each cardholder that gave
estimates of the amount of time and cost each individual would
endure in only paying the minimum.
0 6
Credit card companies jointly sued the Attorney General of
California for injunctive relief from the bill.' 0 7 They charged that the
law was preempted by federal banking laws,'0 8 and thus inapplicable
101 Id.
102 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1748.13 (2002), invalidated by American Bankers
Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal., 2002).
103 Id.; See Donald R. Cassling, Federal Banking Laws Completely Preempted
a State Law Designed to Warn Credit Cardholders About the Dangers Associated
with only Paying Their Minimum Balances, 120 BANKING L.J. 548, 548 (2002)
(discussing American Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal.,
2002)).
104 Cassling, supra note 103.
105 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1748.13(a)(2)(A). The California law also required that
a toll-free number be available for customers who might have questions regarding
their statement and the new warnings. Id. at § 1748.13(a)(3)(A). However, card
companies who required that cardholders pay 10% of their outstanding balance or
more, or did not impose finance charges, were exempt from having to place the
warning on their customer's statements. Id. at § 1748.13(c)(1).
106 These provisions are almost identical to those contained in the new
bankruptcy law that amends TILA. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the
provisions of BAPCPA that amend disclosure requirements for credit card
companies.
107 American Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1001-002
(E.D. Cal., 2002); Cassling, supra note 103, at 548.
108 American Bankers Ass'n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. The plaintiffs sought
summary judgment on the grounds that Section 1748.13 was preempted by the
NBA, Home Owners' Loan Act ("HOLA"), the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") and the Federal Credit Union Act ("FCUA"). Id. at 1006.
Default over Minimum Payment Hikes
to nationally chartered credit card banks.10 9 The district court granted
temporary injunctive relief to prevent the bill from going into effect
as scheduled in July of 2002.110 The court eventually granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in December of the same
year, noting that consumer protection has traditionally been the sole
province of the NBA. 111 The court held that the bill's requirement
that credit card lenders provide three hypothetical balances with
repayment terms and a toll-free number was preempted by the NBA,
and therefore unenforceable. 2 However, the court noted that the law
could be severed to require credit card lenders to provide only a
generic warning about paying the minimum payment, as the burdens
placed on credit card lenders would be insignificant and the terms
they offered would not be affected.1 13 Nevertheless, because the
legislature did not include a severability clause, the law was struck
down in its entirety. 1
4
B. Common Anti-Consumer Practices in the Credit Card
Industry
Much to the frustration of individual states, and despite
increasing insolvency due to credit card debt, federal preemption has
been a major blockade for states attempting to hold credit card
companies responsible for their anti-consumer actions.
115
Improvements in technology have allowed credit card companies to
become increasingly aggressive in their tactics to extract greater
profits from customers who carry balances. 116 Demos, a non-profit,
non-partisan, national research group investigated the primary
methods credit card companies have used to exploit their
customers.1 17 Below is a summary of the anti-consumer practices that
109 Id. at 1002.
"0 Id. at 1006.
1 Id. at 1016, 1022.
112 Id. at 1014.
113 Cassling, supra note 103, at 550.
114 id.
115 Demos, supra note 7, at 10.
116 Stein, supra note 1, at 1.
117 Demos: A Network for Ideas and Action is a nonprofit, nonpartisan
national research and public policy organization based in New York who produced
two credit card industry practice studies and their effects on the entire population as
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have become commonplace over the past decade."18
1. Lowering Minimum Payment Requirements and Credit
Extension
One common way that credit card issuers unwittingly extract
profits from consumers is through negative amortization." 9 Negative
amortization is accomplished when a credit card issuer offers a
cardholder more credit and lowers the amount required to make a
minimum payment, so that a cardholder paying only the minimum
payment, does not reduce his principal. 1
20
On average, general purpose credit cards (e.g. Visa,
MasterCard and Discover) have lowered the minimum monthly
payment requirement from 5% to between 2 and 3% of a cardholder's
total outstanding balance and have tripled the amount of credit
offered to customers between 1993 and 2000. 12 This trend increased
the amount of credit made available to consumers, while requiring
smaller payments per month, which vastly increased the amount of
time a debtor remained in debt and the amount of interest a credit
card company could collect.' 22 As a result, a credit cardholder's
minimum payments hardly make a dent in his credit card balance.
23
For example, a credit cardholder who pays only his minimum
payment (2% of his balance) and has a credit card balance of $5,000,
assuming an APR of 18% and no other charges are made on the card,
would take forty-six years to pay off with interest costs of $7,789.124
well as several sub-groups. Demos, About Demos, http://www.demos-
usa.org/page2.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006). These comments were used by the
Federal Reserve Board in determining a course of action for the Rulemaking
discussed in Part III of this article.
118 Demos, supra note 7, at 4-6.
119 Id. at4.
120 Id.
121 Id. The amount of credit offered to consumers rose from $777 billion to $3
trillion between 1993 and 2000. Id. The average household now has six credit cards
with an average credit line of $3,500 on each for a total of $21,000 in available
credit. Id.
121 Id. at 4-5
123 Demos, supra note 7, at 5.
124 Id. at 8.
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2. Late Fees and Payment Cut-off Time
Another popular anti-consumer practice is the assessment of
late fees and penalties. Late fees and penalties are now the fastest
growing source of revenue for the industry. 125 After the Supreme
Court's decision in Smiley, credit card companies adopted late fees
and raised them from $5 or $10,126 if a payment was not received
within a twenty-five day grace period, to $29 or $39, often with no
grace period at all.' 2 7 Credit card companies have due dates for each
payment set to a specific hour on the date that the payment is due.' 28
Often, the times are at such early hours in the morning, that
practically all payments received on the due date incur a late fee. 129
In addition to charging late fees, credit card companies use
this "late" payment as an excuse to trigger a "default interest rate"
with a much higher annual percentage rate ("APR") or to cancel a
cardholder's lower introductory rate.' The credit card company is
not required to notify the cardholder of the increased rate, because it
is usually written in fine print on the credit card application.' 31
Therefore, a cardholder may continue to use the card unaware of the
increased rate, until his next statement arrives.
3. Universal Default
In addition, card issuers routinely check the credit score of
their cardholders and increasingly engage in a practice known as
"universal default."' 132 Without ever notifying the debtor of the
change, a creditor may raise the debtor's interest rate based on his
125 Stein, supra note 1, at 1.
126 Id. at 6.
127 Demos, supra note 7, at 5.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. Often, to entice new cardholders or to get a consumer to switch to their
card, a credit card company will offer a cardholder an introductory rate with a
lower APR than the industry standard. In fine print, the new contract will explain
that after the promotional rate or any series of events, including a payment received
after the due date (or due hour), a significantly higher default rate is triggered.)
131 McGeehan, supra note 10, at 1.
132 Demos, supra note 7, at 5.
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poor credit performance with another creditor.' 33 For example, if a
debtor fails to make his MBNA credit card payment that month, his
Bank One Visa creditor may raise his rate on the Visa, even if he
never missed a payment on the card he holds with Bank One.1 34
Events that trigger credit card companies to raise a cardholder's rate
can be as minor as a late payment on a utility bill or simply because
the credit card company felt the customer had taken on too much
debt.'35
4. Retroactive Application of Any Change of Terms
Credit card issuers typically reserve the right to change the
terms of each card for any reason, allowing them to apply higher
default rates to balances that existed before the event that triggered
the default rate even occurred. 136 For instance, if a cardholder with a
balance of $1,000 and an introductory APR of 10% misses a
payment, the cardholder will be charged the default rate (as much as
29%), not only on new purchases but on the $1,000 balance he
accrued before the missed payment. f37 Further, credit card companies
such as Discover, reserve the right to look back eleven months before
the cardholder obtained the card to justify the increase.' 38 Because
the credit card company has reserved the right to change the terms at
anytime, it is not required to notify the cardholder of the retroactive
rate. 39 The credit cardholder is left confused, with little recourse,
because the OCC has upheld the practice so long as the credit card
companies are not intentionally deceiving their customers. 40
III. Federal Regulators Finally Respond in 2003
For decades, credit card companies defended their territory by
having state laws struck down for preemptive reasons with no
133 Id.
134 id.
135 McGeehan, supra note 10, at 2.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 5.
139 Id.
140 McGeehan, supra note 10, at 8.
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response from Congress or the OCC. 14 1 Finally in 2003, the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC"), a joint
committee of: the OCC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"), the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of Thrift
Supervisions, used its administrative power to regulate the
companies. 142 In a joint action, the four agencies issued an advisory
to nationally chartered banks that issue credit cards that required
them to revise some of their anti-consumer practices. 143 The eight
page advisory letter was released on January 8, 2003 and is
applicable to all institutions that offer credit card programs under the
agencies' supervision.
144
A. Advisory Letter and Its Provisions
The advisory issued to credit card lenders recommended
changes in six different areas: (1) Credit Line Management, (2) Over-
Limit Practices, (3) Minimum Payment and Negative Amortization,
(4) Workout and Forbearance, (5) Income Recognition and Loss
Allowance Practices, and (6) Policy Exceptions.a4 5 It threatened
"immediate corrective action" by the agencies for activities of credit
card companies deemed imprudent or inadequate. 146 However, the
joint effort of the federal banking regulators did not require
compliance by a specific deadline or give concrete instructions of
practices that were to be discontinued. 147 Rather, the agencies
recognized that some institutions would need time to make the
changes necessary to comply with the new rules.
148
141 Cassling, supra note 103, at 548.
142 Joint Press Release, supra note 16.
143 See generally Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and the Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC 2003-01, Credit Card Lending: Account
Management and Loss Allowance Guidance (Jan. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2003-1a.doc (an interagency advisory issued
to nationally chartered banks requiring them to revise some of their anti-consumer
practices ).
'44 Id. at 2.
145 Id. at 1.
146 Id. at 2.
147 Id.
148 See Joint Press Release, supra note 16. Credit card companies were
instructed to work with their direct regulator, the OCC to ask for additional time for
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1. Tightening Credit Lines
The first area that the advisory sought to correct was credit
line management, due to the concern that credit card lenders were not
considering the repayment capacity of their borrowers. 149 The
advisory required that lenders test, analyze and document the criteria
used before determining credit-line increases and assignments. 150 It
was further recommended that lenders base their decisions on factors
such as repayment history, risk and behavior scores. 151 Credit lenders
were asked to review their methods of determining how much credit.
was offered to an individual consumer and to ensure that assignment
of credit was conservatively tailored to the individual's ability to
repay the credit. 152 The provisions also stated that it was unacceptable
for lenders to issue additional cards to borrowers who had previously
experienced payment problems on existing cards.153
2. Minimum Payments and Negative Amortization
The most significant area of reform for the purposes of this
article came in the form of one sentence stating that the "[a]gencies
expect lenders to require a minimum payment that will amortize the
current balance over a reasonable period of time."'1 54 This sentence
put credit card companies on notice that negative amortization,
inappropriate fees and other practices that inordinately extend or
prolong consumer debt are subject to close scrutiny by the OCC.155
The advisory did not define what a reasonable period of time
would be. However, in later press releases, the OCC clarified that "a
reasonable period of time" for a payment plan to mean one that
required 1% of the principal be paid per month or approximately 4%
compliance. Id. This article will discuss only the provisions of the new rules that
affect credit card users.
149 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., supra note 143, at 2.
150 Id.
151 id.
152 id.
153 Id. at 2.
154 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., supra note 143, at 3. ...
with the unsecured, consumer-oriented nature of the underlying debt and the
borrower's documented creditworthiness.").
155 id.
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of a consumer's total balance, 156 and on December 1, 2005,
Comptroller of the Currency, John C. Dugan announced that most
banks were expected to be in compliance with the negative
amortization provisions by the end of 2005.157 In a press release, he
emphasized that lenders were encouraged to work with consumers
who had trouble meeting the higher minimum payment requirements
and to avoid "to the maximum extent possible" writing down the loan
and cutting off the customer's credit. 158 In early January of 2006,
Kevin Murki, a spokesman for the OCC, said that nearly all banks
have complied with the regulation and those that have not were
required to give the OCC "a good reason" for their noncompliance.'
59
3. Workout and Forbearance Programs
The third major part of the advisory dealt with "Workout" or
Forbearance Programs for credit card holders.' 60 This addressed the
issue of cardholders, who formerly had open-end credit cards with
the lender but now had their credit availability closed and their
balance placed on a fixed repayment schedule with modified terms.1
61
The agencies encouraged lenders to work with debtors who had
defaulted on their payments to create alternative payback
programs. 62 The advisory emphasized that the programs should be
designed to maximize principal reduction,' 63 and must require that
borrowers repay their credit card debt within sixty months.M The
156 Der Hovanesian, supra note 9, at 1. Barbara J Grunkemeyer, Deputy
Controller for Credit Risk at the OCC, explained, "[w]e were concerned that people
were making smaller and smaller payments, but not making any headway" in
paying off loans.) See also Singletary, supra note 17.
157 Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, NR 2005-117,
Comptroller Dugan Expresses Concern about Negative Amortization (Dec. 1,
2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?Doc =
151QIBS3.xml.
158 Id.
159 David Lazarus, Minimum Payment Millstones, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 2006,
at Cl.
160 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., supra note 143, at 4.
161 Id. at 2.
162 Id. at 4.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 2.
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agencies suggested that credit card lenders reduce or eliminate
interest payments and fees so that they may feasibly recover the
principal within the sixty month workout period. 1
65
4. Compliance
The advisory broadly applies to all institutions that offer
credit card programs but lacks an independent enforcement
mechanism. It leaves enforcement to the specific agency designated
to regulate each institution (e.g. the OCC regulates nationally
chartered credit card banks).'6 Each agency will assess the risk
profile of each institution to determine whether its account
management practices are sound. 167 The advisory requires that each
agency more rigorously scrutinize higher-risk portfolios such as those
that use negative amortization for over-limit accounts. 168 An agency
may use its discretion to regulate the credit card banks it regulates,
and the advisory threatens institutions with the penalty of immediate
corrective action when it is found to engage in practices deemed
inadequate or imprudent.' 69 However, there are no specific penalties
for infractions listed in the advisory, leaving execution of any
enforcement actions solely to the discretion of the regulating agency.
5. OCC Enforcement
The OCC and all other federal banking regulators have both a
supervisory role and an enforcement role in carrying out policy.
17 °
All banks are subject to a comprehensive, annual examination by
their regulator in which a team of examiners make on-site visits and
analyze the details of individual loans made by the institution. 17 1 In
addition, banks are required to submit quarterly reports of condition
("call reports") that contain detailed balance sheet data allowing the
regulator to assess the soundness of the lending institution.'1 72
165 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., supra note 143, at 4.
166 Id. at 2.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Macey, supra note 32, at 640.
171 Id. at 644.
172 Id.
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If the lending institution is found to be unsound, the OCC
may enforce its policies through various means.1 73 The OCC may
take formal actions such as issuing a cease and desist order, removing
management, imposing civil money penalties of as much as $1
million a day, denying FDIC insurance or even imposing criminal
penalties. 74 Additionally, because banking regulators have such
tremendous power over the institutions they regulate, the OCC also
enforces certain actions indirectly, using what is known as its "arm-
twisting" power. 175 For example, the agency may threaten to deny
licenses, refuse to enter into procurement agreements, disseminate
adverse publicity or impose other sanctions against a non-compliant
bank. 176 However, as of January 2006, the OCC has not yet taken any
action for practices in violation of the advisory guidelines.
B. Bankruptcy Law Amends TILA Requiring More Disclosure
Following the OCC's lead, Congress has also attempted to
correct some of the anti-consumer policies adopted by credit card
companies that have led to an increased number of personal
bankruptcy filings. 77 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") went into effect on
October 17, 2005, and amends the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") to
require, among other things, 178 greater disclosure of credit terms to
cardholders in an effort to curb bankruptcy filings derived from credit
card default.' 79 The bill does not require credit card issuers to make
any changes in rates, but rather seeks to better educate the credit
cardholder by requiring more comprehensive disclosures of the terms
171 Id. at 662.
174 Michael P. Malloy, Principles of Bank Regulation, at 299-235 (Concise
Hornbook Series, 2d ed., West 2003).
175 Macey, supra note 32, at 664.
176 Id. at 665.
177 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
178 Other sections of the act seek to discourage both personal and corporate
bankruptcy filings by amending current bankruptcy law. Id. at § 221. These
sections may affect consumers who are now required to make higher minimum
payments. However, only the added disclosures will be discussed for the purposes
of this article.
179 Id. § 1301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2005)).
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1. Minimum Payment Warnings
One of the goals of BAPCPA is to better educate consumers
about the terms of credit they receive.1 81 BAPCPA amends TILA by
adding a provision that requires issuers of open-ended credit plans to
post a "Minimum Payment Warning" on monthly billing
statements.182 The warning must appear on all accounts that require a
minimum payment of less than 4% of the balance.' 83 The warning is
required to include an example showing that at an interest rate of
17%, a balance of $1,000 would take eight 8eight months to repay if
only the 2% minimum payment was made. The credit lender must
also list next to the warning a toll-free phone number maintained by
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). 185 Borrowers may call this
number to obtain an estimate of the number of months it would take
to pay off their balance in full.186 Interestingly, the provisions of the
Act are almost identical to those contained in California statute that
was held in violation of the NBA. 187
The Act requires a different warning for credit cards that
require minimum payments of more than 4% of a cardholder's total
balance. 88 The warning must state that a minimum payment rate of
5%, at 17% interest, will take twenty-four months to pay off a
balance of $300 in full. 189 However, the Act provides an escape
hatch. If a credit lender chooses to maintain its own toll-free number
for the purpose of providing customers with the actual number of
180 id.
181 id.
182 Id. § 1301.
183 Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(1 1)(A)).
184 id.
185 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 1301 (2005).
186 Id.
187 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1748.13 (2002), invalidated by American Bankers
Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal., 2002); see supra Part II.A.5 for
a discussion of the California statute.
188 Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(1 1)(B)).
189 Id.
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months required to pay a balance in full, it may omit the example and
state only the boilerplate warning.'
90
2. Introductory Rates and Late Fees
Another major area of regulation relates to greater clarity in
disclosing terms such as introductory APRs and late fees.'
9 1
Specifically, the Act requires that the issuer disclose under what
circumstances a borrower may incur a late fee and the amount of the
penalty. 192 Lenders are also required to disclose, "clearly and
conspicuously" on each billing statement, the date in which the
payment is due, or if different, the earliest date in which a late fee
may be assessed, as well as the amount of the late fee.'
93
In addition, introductory rates, or those offered for less than
one year, must be "clearly and conspicuously" disclosed on the
application.' 94 The issuer must provide a general description of the
temporary APR as well as the APR that will apply after the
temporary period. 195 Also, the application is required to give a
general description of the circumstances that may cause a temporary
rate to be revoked and whether the new rate would be a higher fixed
rate or one that would vary with an index. 196 Six months after
BAPCPA's enactment, the Board will meet with other federal
banking agencies to better define what is meant by "clear and
conspicuous". 197
190 Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11)(J)). A creditor that maintains a
toll-free telephone number for the purpose of providing customers with the actual
number of months that it will take to repay an outstanding balance shall include the
following statement: 'Making only the minimum payment will increase the interest
you pay and the time it takes to repay your balance. For more information, call this
toll-free number: ." Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(1 1)(K)).
191 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 1305 (2005) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1637(b)(12)).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. § 1303 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(6)(i)).
195 Id.
196 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 1303 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1637(c)(ii)-(iii)).
197 Id. § 1309(c). The Act sets a standard stating:
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IV. Consumer Impact
The advisory and the amendments to TILA contained in
BAPCPA are significant steps in correcting some of the abusive
practices engaged in by credit card issuers but may not be a complete
solution given the lack of specific penalties for infractions. It is
promising that both Congress and federal regulators have recognized
that credit card debt is becoming a considerable source of personal
bankruptcy filings and have reacted formally with legislation.
However, because the advisory can only be enforced at the discretion
of the OCC and BAPCPA contains loopholes that allow credit card
lenders to evade compliance, the actions will not reverse all of the
anti-consumer practices that have become the norm over the past
three decades.
In the long run, increased minimum payments will benefit
consumers. 198 Consumers' total costs will decrease, allowing them to
become debt-free within a shorter period of time.1 99 However,
consumers who have adjusted their finances around the lower
minimum payments will most likely suffer short-term effects. Thus
far, banks have experienced more customer defaults since the
enactment of payment raises.20 0 Bank of America, one of the first to
raise its minimums in the second quarter of 2004, experienced a 63%
increase in net charge-offs for bad loans totaling $691 million in that
quarter.2° 1 However, by the end of the year the amount was reduced
to $40 million that could be attributed to charge-offs, suggesting that
banks will have an initial adjustment period that will eventually
stabilize.202
In promulgating regulations under this section, the Board shall ensure
that the clear and conspicuous standard required for disclosures made
under the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act referred to in
subsection (a) can be implemented in a manner which results in
disclosures which are reasonably understandable and designed to call
attention to the nature and significance of the information in the notice.
198 Singletary, supra note 17, at 1.
199 Id.
200 Der Hovanesian, supra note 9, at 2.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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A. Credit Lenders Exercise Caution on the OCC's Watch
The guidance given to credit card companies by the OCC has
already led to a decrease in some of the anti-consumer practices
previously engaged in by the industry.2 °3 Under the close scrutiny of
the OCC, several credit card companies have dropped their "universal
default" policies. 20 4 Particularly, the OCC's concern with negative
amortization will discourage credit card lenders from developing
additional anti-consumer practices that extend the time and amount of
interest extracted from each account.
While agencies regulating the credit card industry are
primarily concerned with avoiding bank defaults and over-extension
of credit 20 5 rather than protecting consumers, the OCC effectively
accomplishes both goals by requiring that banks tailor the amount of
credit offered to the consumer's ability to repay.20 6 The advisory lets
credit card issuers know that their anti-consumer methods of
extracting profits are under surveillance and will not go unnoticed.
Because the advisory does not list specific consequences for
actions deemed inappropriate, the OCC regulates the credit card
industry in a way that is similar to a parent disciplining a disobedient
child. As credit card companies certainly realize that they have over
extended credit and engaged in "negative amortization," the advisory
will cause them to adjust their behavior to avoid the uncertain
consequences of upsetting their disciplinarian. It is up to the OCC to
remain strict in enforcing its provisions, so that credit card companies
will not revert to their old practices.
By issuing a general list of areas that credit card companies
will be under scrutiny to improve upon, the OCC retained the
capacity to clarify terms after banks begin to comply. For example,
the advisory's vague request that lenders require minimum payments
amortizing current balances "over a reasonable time," allowed banks
to react to the request, while the OCC determined its own definition
207
of at least 1% of principal per month. The ambiguity of the
advisory, coupled with the ominous idea that credit card lenders
"' Barbara A. Rehm, Citi Shake-Up, Wal-Mart, and Other Highlights of a
Truly Stormy Year, AM. BANKER, Dec. 1, 2005, at 29A.
204 Id.
205 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., supra note 143, at 2.
206 Id.
207 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., supra note 143, at 2; Der
Hovanesian, supra note 9, at 98.
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know they are being watched, will most likely cause lenders to
change some of their less scrupulous policies. The fact that the
consequences for particular infractions have not been spelled out may
promote change throughout the industry to amend practices such as
negative amortization, out of fear of "arm-twisting".
B. TILA Amendments Provide Too Much Leeway
On the other hand, Congress used the regulatory method of
mandatory disclosure in enacting the TILA amendments in
BAPCPA.20 8 The philosophy behind increased disclosure of terms to
consumers is to correct some of the asymmetries of information in
the marketplace, allowing consumers to make better and more
rational decisions.2 0 9 This idea presupposes that the consumer is a
rational actor, and will actually read the disclosures, understand them
and adjust his behavior to most efficiently allocate his resources.216
After much prompting by numerous investigations in both the House
and the Senate, Congress has decided to extend its efforts in curbing
abusive lending to the credit card industry, in its attempt to decrease
the number of personal bankruptcy filings with BAPCPA. l l
However, studies increasingly reveal that disclosure does not always
212
work. Moreover, while many Americans are aware of the dangers
of paying only their minimum payments, they are faced with few
alternatives to provide basic necessities for their families. 213
208 Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory
Disclosure: Socio-economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 199, 201-02 (2005).
209 Id. at 203.
210 Id.
211 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(1), at 17 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 103 ("In addition, S. 256 amends the Truth in Lending Act to require certain
credit card solicitations, monthly billing statements, and related materials to include
important disclosures and explanatory statements regarding introductory interest
rates and minimum payments, among other matters. These additional disclosures
are intended to give debtors important information to enable them to better manage
their financial affairs").
212 Edwards, supra note 208.
213 Demos: A Network for Ideas and Action & Ctr. for Responsible Lending,
The Plastic Safety Net: The Reality Behind Debt in America 10-11 Oct. 2005),
available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/PSN low.pdf. A study conducted by
Demos revealed that the majority of consumers who only pay their minimum
balances are using their cards for essential purchases, not luxury items which are
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1. How Clear and Conspicuous is 'Clear and Conspicuous'?
A Spokesman for the OCC, stated that the disclosures to
consumers would ideally be as effective as the FDA food label,
although admittedly the perils of minimum credit card payments have
not achieved anywhere near the level of transparency of today's food
214labels. Depending on how the Board eventually interprets the
meaning of "clear and conspicuous," it may achieve some success. If
the warning is sufficiently large and pervasive enough, consumers,
who are not particularly financially literate, will likely be more
inclined to read the warning and consider the meaning of the
examples. Much of the success of the FDA food labels can be
attributed to its standardized display of nutritional facts that is easily
read by the consumer.215 Similarly, a credit card holder would benefit
from a uniform warning that leaves little leeway for credit card
companies to make misrepresentations.
2. Toll-free Numbers are an Escape Hatch
Critics of BAPCPA complain that the law provides credit card
companies with an escape hatch from full compliance with the
mandatory disclosures.216 A credit card company may opt to provide
its own toll-free number allowing customers to call for an estimate of
the number of months it will take to pay off their balance making
217only minimum payments. In this case, the company is only
required to list a boilerplate minimum payment warning. 218 The
generic warning will have little or no effect on a bill payer if it is not
accompanied by a specific example customized to the bill or even
out of their budget. Id.
214 Lazarus, supra note 159, at C1.
215 The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, §
343, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.). The FDA standardized terms, including portion sizes and which criteria
(e.g. calories, fat, saturated fat, etc.) had to be disclosed, to better inform the
consumer. For example, before the regulation of food labels, food producers could
make their food appear more nutritious by providing nutritional information based
on impractical portion sizes. Id.
216 Lazarus, supra note 159, at C1.
217 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 1301 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11)(J)-
(K)).
218 Id.
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three generic examples using standard debt amounts and APRs.2 19 By
requiring the consumer to make the phone call, rather than directly
providing him with the information, the law has almost no effect on
lessening the asymmetries in information that exist between debtor
and lender.220
3. Disclosure is not the Whole Problem
Educating consumers about the actual terms of their credit
cards is important but it is not enough. Studies have shown that the
majority of credit cardholders who make only the minimum payment
are aware that they need to make significantly greater payments than
required by their minimum, but are simply unable to do so.
22 1
Further, when applying for credit cards, many borrowers
underestimate their future borrowing.222 Consumers may understand
the terms of their cards, but do not consider the possibility that a late
or missed payment will cause their APR to switch to the default
rate.223 Moreover, even if all terms are disclosed clearly to
consumers, the consumer may not feel compelled to read or
understand them and adjust their behavior accordingly. 22' Experts
argue that disclosure remedies need to be more carefully crafted to
overcome these behavioral biases.225
C. Few Alternative Sources of Credit
For millions of Americans who carry debt, increased
minimum credit card payments will be a hardship on their already
tight budgets.226 Credit card debt is unique in that it is available to
almost anyone. Interest rates charged are typically commensurate to
the credit risk an individual poses, but even customers with very
modest income and poor credit history are typically granted at least
219 Lazarus, supra note 159.
220 Id. See also Edwards, supra note 208, at 204. The goal of TILA and
greater disclosure is to correct asymmetries in the marketplace. Id.
221 Demos, supra note 213, at 15.
222 Edwards, supra note 208, at 233.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 234.
225 Id. at 233-34.
226 Demos, supra note 213, at 2.
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some credit by credit card lenders. 227 If the credit card industry is too
heavily regulated, those Americans who are most dependent upon
credit may be denied the only source that was previously extended to
them. Excessive credit card industry regulation could leave some
worse off than before if credit card companies only lend to those who
have assured payback capacity.
Studies show that homeowners may turn to home equity
loans, which have lower interest rates, to substitute one creditor for
another.228 Experts fear that borrowers may use their homes to secure
a loan with a lower interest rate, to pay off their balances. However,
in doing so, the homeowner runs the risk of losing his home if he
defaults on those payments.229 Americans who rent their homes have
even fewer financial resources than homeowners and may be forced
to rely on loans from family members and fringe lenders, such as
payday lenders and pawnshops, to cover the higher minimum
payments. 230 This group will be most severely affected by the
increased minimums and are at the greatest risk of having to file
bankruptcy.
Workout plans provide another alternative for the insolvent
borrower. The OCC has instructed credit card lenders to work with
customers who will have trouble paying the higher minimum
payments and has suggested reducing interest rates and waiving late
fees to focus on the primary goal of recovering the principal.231
However, credit card lenders will likely avoid this practice as they
will lose significant profits. 232 Under the auspices of the OCC,
reluctant credit card lenders may be forced to offer the workout plans
suggested in the advisory to aid customers whose increased
minimums will create a hardship.233
V. Conclusion
Over the last two decades, the virtually unregulated credit
227 Edwards, supra note 208, at 205.
228 See Demos, supra note 213, at 14-15.
229 Id. at 19.
230 Id. at 14.
231 Der Hovanesian, supra note 9, at 98.
232 Id.
233 See supra Part III.A.3.
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card industry has become complicated and anti-consumer oriented.234
Consumers' desire for more credit regardless of the terms or their
ability to repay, has led many Americans down a self-destructive path
toward bankruptcy. The new attempts by Congress and the federal
banking regulators are the first steps made in twenty-five years that
attempt to restrict the credit card industry in any way. The advisory
has the potential to require major changes in the way that credit card
companies conduct business with their customers if the OCC
stringently enforces it. BAPCPA places more of the responsibility on
the consumer in mandating disclosure, but may be too easily
circumvented by credit card companies to achieve its desired effect.
Although both the advisory and BAPCPA have their flaws, on
the whole, Americans will benefit from paying higher minimum
payments. In the short term, a few Americans may experience
growing pains, but in the long run, Americans' personal finances will
grow stronger when less crippled by the weight of credit card debt.
234 Stein, supra note 1, at 1.
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